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STATE REGULATION-PROPERTY IN OIL AND NATURAL GAS.
As illustrating how far a State can go in protecting rights of
the public at the expense of individuals, and in marking out
the peculiar nature of property rights in oil and natural gas,
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, is an important case.
It was held that a statute prohibiting the free escape of gas or
oil, was not a taking of private property within the i 4 th amend-
ment, although the Oil Company was interested solely in get-
ting oil, and to do so with profit, it was necessary to permit the
gas to escape.
Natural gas and oil are practically minerals ferz natura,
and until reduction to physical possession the surface owners
have no actual property therein; merely the right to reduce.
Brown v. Vandegrift, 8o Penn. St. 142; People's Gas Co. v. Tywer, 131
Ind. 271. But the analogy is not complete, for then the right
being in the public, could be withheld. Greer v. Conneticu, 161
U. S. 519. Consequently there being no property, there could
be no taking without due process as claimed. The fact that the
company, engaged solely in extracting oil, suffers a hardship,
-goes to the wisdom and not the power of the Legislature, in
paising such an act.
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The importance of the object sought after-the preservation
of a source of great wealth-seems to amply justify such legis-
lation, as courts have held waste by one surface owner did
not give an action to another suffering loss thereby. Hague v.
Wheeler, 157 Penn. St. 324; Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 Atl. Rep.
1074; the State ought to have the power by legislation to curb
indiscriminate waste which might involve the loss of entire oil
and gas deposits.
ASSOCIATED PRESS-DUTY TO PUBLIC-ILLEGAL CONDITIONS.
The recent case of the Inter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press
Co., 56 N. W., Rep. 822, makes a new application of the law of
monopolies which is of great importance. The Inter-Ocean was
a member of the Associated Press Co., under contract to receive
its news upon condition that it was neither to furnish nor re-
ceive news from outside companies deemed antagonistic. It
violated its covenant by receiving from the Sun Printing and
Publishing Co. news which the Associated Press was unable to
furnish. By its agreement this rendered it liable to suspension
from the Associated Press. An injunction is granted to pre-
vent this, on the ground that the business of the Associated
Press is impressed with a public interest, and must be carried
on without discrimination, and that the provision in its by-laws
requiring the exclusive use of its news as a condition of mem-
bership is void, as tending to create a monopoly.
. This puts associations for collecting and vending news upon
a plane with common carriers, telephone and telegraph com-
panies as to their duty to treat all impartially; and news is
deemed a commodity of public necessity which, like coal, gas,
water, etc., it is illegal to monopolize. The justice and logic of
this view can hardly be denied and is well supported by
authority. A board of trade cannot withhold market quota-
tions after a compliance with reasonable rules. N. Y. & Chicago
Exchange v. Chicago Board of Trade, 127 Ill. '53. And telegraph
and telephone companies must serve indiscriminately, their
duty to the public being superior to any contract which they
may have with an owner, whose patent they use. Com. Union
Tel. Co. v. N. E. Teleg. &-" Tep. Co., 6 Vt. 241; Chesapeake Co. v. B.
0. Tel. Co., 66 Md. 399; though this is denied in Amer. Tel. Co. v.
Conn. Tel. Co., 49 Conn. 352.
The duty of the Associated Press to the public is paramount
to the rights it had under contract against the Iner-Ocean, and
a provision compelling the exclusive use of its news is there-
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fore against public policy and void. It undoubtedly tends to
create a monopoly and gives to'its possessor the power to dic-
tate what news the public shall receive, regardless of what it
ought to have. This is a power too dangerous and vital to be
above public control, and is not such a reasonable regulation as
all.quasi-public corporations have the right to prescribe. Smiti
v. Tel. Co., 42 Hun. 454. Nevertheless, a similar restriction was
held good in New York on the ground that a cooperative society
had the right to make rules governing its members.
Had the court decided in the present case that such was a
reasonable regulation as only a partial restraint of trade, it
might then have presented the interesting Federal question as
to whether it would not come under the Anti-Trust Act of 189o,
declaring combinations in restraint of interstate commerce void
without regard to their reasonableness. From what Chief
Justice Marshall said in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I, it might be
that interstate news which is bought and sold is included within
interstate commerce.
TRUSTS-PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE REMEDY ADOPTED BY TEXAS.
The amount of discussion and divergence of opinion ex-
pressed in recent magazine publications, more than any compli-
cation of legal principles involved, induces us to review the
recent decision of the Federal Supreme C9urt in the case of
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State of Texas, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5 18, in
which proceeding the defendant company has been forbidden
doing business in the State of Texas, being held to have vio-
lated certain provisions of the Texas anti-trust law, and there-
by having forfeited its license. The principles of law an-
nounced are extremely impsortant, though they seem quite well
settled.
The usual law exists in Texas (Acts of 1889, p. 87) whereby a
f9reign corporation, upon filing a certified copy of its articles
of incorporation with the Secretary of State, secures a licence
to do business in the State. The Waters-Pierce Oil Co., comply-
ing with these provisions, obtained such a license for a period of
ten years, and engaged in active business. Subsequent to the
issuance of this license an anti-trust law was passed, and this
proceeding was brought against the plaintiff in error, alleging
a violation of this law, and praying that its license be revoked.
It is clear, construing the statute according to the interpre-
tation given it by the Texas courts, that no question of inter-
state commerce is involved; commerce consisting in the trans-
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portation of commodities, and not in their sale. Exparte Koeh-
lier, 30 Fed. Rep. 869. And as the construction placed upon a
State statute by the courts of the State is held in the present
case not open to review by the Federal Courts, inquiry into the
interpretation of the statute, its construction and the question
of interstate commerce are summarily disposed of. Tullis v.
L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 275 U. S. 348; R. R. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404.
The really serious question involved is this: "Can a State
license a foreign corporation to do business within its limits,
and after money, time and labor are expended by the company,
in good faith, pass such legislation, after the granting of the
license, as will produce such a result as that involved in the
present case ? The consideration of this proposition is not
indispensable to a review of the case, as at the time the license
was issued to the Waters-Pierce Oil Co. an anti-trust law ex-
isted, which was as much violated by the company as the one
subsequently passed was; but we consider the question, for the
reason that it has been so persistently discussed in connection
with the present case. A license issued to a foreign corpora-
tion for valuable consideration, even though construed as a con-
tract, is always subject to such reasonable violation, at the
hands of the State, as a proper exercise of the police power may
effect. Afetropolitian Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 65 7; Stone
v. Mississzlpi, ioi U. S. 814. A State cannot by any grant estop
itself from a free and unrestricted exercise of its police power.
Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S., 25, and the passage of an anti-trust
law is held to be such an exercise of this power. Mrunn et a. v.
State of Ills., 94 U. S. 77. Hence the passage of an anti-trust law
affecting the rights held by a foreign corporation under a license
previously granted is valid.
And further, the law seems clear to the effect that the word
citizen as used in the Federal Constitution, § 2, Art. IV, and in
the XIV amendment does not apply to corporations, hence the
plea respecting equal privileges and immunities is of no avail.
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. i68, Pembina Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S.
181. The great questions involved in this case are compara-
tively free from controversy among the authorities. The sur-
prise manifested in current publications at the decision arises
chiefly for the reason that exactly such facts have not occurred
before to which our supreme tribunal could apply the well
established rules of law.
